Skip to content

ALIENs

alien-being-born-4

alien-being-born-6

alien-being-born-7

What are the psychological consequences of seeing oneself as a vehicle hosting selfish genes that would eventually destroy the body? Does that make one see a pregnancy as the gene’s victory? Or the host’s free will? Can a “vehicle” even claim to have a free will or have reproductive desires been confiscated by these little selfish replicators?

There is something frightening in Dawkins’ theory as this approach somewhat disconnects us from our bodies. Is our anatomy managed by an independent agency with a different agenda? It brings to mind the anxiety illustrated by the concoction of science fiction and horror in Ridley Scott’s Alien, a film “about human loneliness amid the emptiness and amorality of creation.” (Andrew O’Hehir)

In his book On Film (2002) Stephen Malhall interprets the story of the alien that infiltrates the body only to grow its own parasitical offsprings, whose birth kills the host body, as an investigation “into the condition of sequeldom,” namely the limitations and possibilities internal to the inheritance of “a particular set of characters in a particular narrative universe”(5) “what-mythologically speaking-endows Ripley with her drive for survival is herresolute repression of her drive to reproduce; and in this respect, she exists in utter opposition to the alien’s incarnation of that drive. In other words, to become capable and worthy of vanquishing her opponent, she must sever the connection between femaleness, heterosexual intercourse and fertility- she must, in short, deny her body’s openness to maternity” (25).
Does the modern-day-myth of the Alien series conclude that self inflicted infertility equals victory over the harmful monsters who seized our bodies?

Slavoj Zizek writes about the internal parasite alien in Finney’s The Invasion of the Body Snatchers. In this story a town is taken over by the aliens who penetrated and colonized human bodies, controlling them from within: although the aliens look and act exactly like humans, there is as a rule a tiny detail which betrays their true nature (a strange glimpse in their eyes; too much skin between their fingers or between their ears and heads). This detail, according to Zizek, is “the Lacanian objet petit a, a tiny feature whose presence magically transubstantiates its bearer into an alien. In contrast to Scott’s alien who is totally different from humans, the difference is here minimal, barely perceptible.”

This objet petit, could it now represent a mutation? A devilish selfish gene? Do carriers feel like their bodies have been snatched?

Tagged , , , ,

THE SELFISH GENE

safari_1

This term, coined by Richard Dawkins expresses a gene-centred view of evolution. The contention is that the genes that get passed on are the ones whose consequences serve their own implicit interests (to continue being replicated), not necessarily those of the organism.
In Dawkins theory, we cannot view the act of conception as replication of the full organism (human), the human is only a vehicle, made of replicators (genes). He defined a replicator as any entity in the universe of which copies are made. Until human cloning becomes a reality, humans as whole organisms cannot be seen as replicators, since a baby can never be a perfect copy of the parent. Therefore the human takes the role of a vehicle:

A vehicle is any unit, discrete enough to seem worth naming, which houses a collection of replicators and which works as a unit for the preservation and propagation of those replicators.” (Dawkins, The Extended Phenotype, 1982,p.114)

Dawkins writes that gene combinations which help an organism to survive and reproduce tend to also improve the gene’s own chances of being passed on and, as a result, frequently “successful” genes will also be beneficial to the organism. However there are other times when the implicit interests of the vehicle and replicator are in conflict, Another good example is the existence of segregation distortion genes that are detrimental to their host but nonetheless propagate themselves at its expense.
These genes are metaphorically described as “selfish” as they are dedicated to replicate and be represented in all next generations, regardless of the effect they might have on the whole organism - the vehicle. The adaptations are always for the benefit of the gene.

“Cancers are selfish cell lineages: clones of cells that, within an individual’s lifetime, have evolved high rates of replication compared to other clones, at the expense of the host fitness. They arise and spread by the conventional Darwinian process of repeated rounds of mutation and selection.” Burt and Trives, Genes in Conflict: The Biology of Selfish Genetic Elements)

These examples might suggest that there is a power-struggle between genes and their host. In fact, the claim is that there isn’t much of a struggle because the genes usually win without a fight. Only if the organism becomes intelligent enough to understand its own interests, as distinct from those of its genes, can there be true conflict. An example of this would be a person deciding to use contraception, even though their genes lose out due to this decision.

Can the selfish gene hypothesis exonerate a mutation transmitter from blame? Could that person be seen as simply an innocent vehicle controlled by the desires of their powerful selfish genes?

Tagged , , , , ,

the SELFISH person

barbie

How is the desire to have a biological baby interpreted? Is it an indisputable biological urge or an act of selfishness?
“Wanting a child that is genetically one’s own is a desire deeply implanted in many of us by our religious, cultural, and ethical traditions. It is not per se an unworthy impulse to be dismissed out of hand. The desperate pursuit by many people of treatment for their infertility is testimony to the power of this consideration.” (Andre et al, 2000)

Having biological children probably is a result of a selfish need, but selfish not necessarily in a negative way. The hypothetical person is not capable of having any desires or needs, so his creation must only answer the needs of the creators. Beyond the evolutionary or biological explanations of the hormonal demand for a pregnancy or the need to procreate as a result of a survival instinct, a child is often seen as the malleable extension of the self, an agent of fulfilment, purpose and immortalisation.

Is there any legitimicy in criticising any of these behaviours or aspirations? It could be argued that it is unethical to condemn someone to life out of a selfish need or desire, but wouldn’t this be an paradoxical critique of human nature? Actually, of any living organism?

Tagged , , ,

Hypothetical people

back-to-the-future

Within the discussion of genetic responsibility, and especially in relation to pre-conception solutions there is a constant question of the ethical treatment of “possible persons”. With technology and longevity comes a tendency to always look ahead and to seek for methods of control. Science + future forecasting makes prevention of possible people from existing an interesting tool to influence the future of a family (and society at large).
A couple aware of their carrier status and wishing to become parents have a number of options available to enable them to avoid transmitting a mutation to future generations: self-enforced infertility (and adoption), the use of donor gametes, preimplantation genetic diagnosis plus embryo selection or prenatal screening plus selective termination.

All these options can be portrayed as ways to avoid bringing into the world an hypothetical baby who carries their mutation, and will possibly one day develop a life-threatening disease. By never creating this baby, are the parents protecting it from harm? Is the elimination of the potentially ill the moral thing to do? The aversion of the fatal flaw?

According to bioethicist David Heyd, the difficulty is that genesis problems concern possible persons, whereas standard moral frameworks are intended to provide guidance for behaviour that affects actual persons. The only options available to an affected carriers’ baby are non-existence or existence as a mutation carrier. Heyd claims that if the born mutation carrier child prefers life with a potential of illness to not having been born at all, we have no rational basis for claiming that s/he has been harmed or wronged. (Genethics: Moral Issues in the Creation of People, 1992)

In that case, the genetically knowledgeable carrier parents who decided to have an intervention-free biological child cannot be blamed. However, can the moral code flip in the transition between hypothesis and actuality? What is right for the hypothetical person might be seen as wrong when the actual one suffers from illness. On behalf of who’s best interest did the parents act? Can we define this behaviour as kind or selfish?

Tagged , , , ,

Miasma

434815943_5646db1217

In Greek mythology, a miasma is a contagious power that has an independent life of its own. Until purged by the sacrificial death of the wrongdoer, society would be chronically infected by catastrophe.
The Greek drew parallels between birth and death as equal sources of miasma, and those who were in contact with the dead or newborn, as well as distant blood relatives, were considered polluted by proximity, physical or genetic. Although theories of miasma were later projected onto infectious diseases like the plague, one of the most interesting aspects of the original term was the belief that miasma spreads moral pollution.

“Miasma is a complex, metaphysical, non-moral term that covers activities from dreams to murder, the common thread being activities that inspire in society awe and dread. It is a term that explains otherwise inexplicable events, and therefore appears to be a supernatural response. One’s “dirt” may, and usually does, spill over onto innocent bystanders and fellow citizens, creating the need for a scapegoat so tat society may cleanse itself of the pollutant.” (Elise P. Garrison)

Do we now consider genetic mutations as miasma? A mutation may not be contagious by air or water, however it can be seen as a result of a casual chain of past events, resulting in a grave dislocation of normal life.
Is chemotherapy the purifying ritual? Or is that the pre-implantation genetic diagnosis process, purifying the fabric of society from a miasma of genetic mutation? The source of contamination (the parent) purifies their genetic line as an act of social repentance? Scarifying the potential future wrongdoers?

Tagged ,

Hamartia

frankenstein_monster_boris_karloff

In the classic Greek tragedy, the first stage in the tragic chain of events is the Hamarita - the fatal flaw. Hamartia, an injury committed in ignorance (when the person affected or the results are not what the agent supposed they were) seen as an error in judgment or unwitting mistake. Another common interpretation of hamartia can be seen as a “moral deficit” or a “moral error”.

Interestingly, the ignorance - or lack of agency never spares the hero from the tragic end. Is the mutation carrier choosing to have a child without going through genetic testing or pre-implantation genetic diagnosis making a fatal flaw? Does the imminent catastrophe leaves a stain on their ethos? Are they condemned to a life of suffering and regrets? Have they just spread moral pollution throughout the family line?

Tagged , , , ,

the TRAGEDY of genetic mutation

a77d1c8cc9

Is it possible that the narrative of genetic mutation within a family line has the elements of a Greek tragedy? Much like the dramatic art-form originated from hymns in praise of Dionysus - god of fertility, wine and ecstasy, it raises the core questions of human existence, questions of suffering, of fate, family, (hubris?) and punishment.

From the fatal flaw, the irreversible horrible deed that has unintentionally impaired the loved one, evoking both horror and compassion from the crowd, the revelation or recognition, leading to helpless suffering and ending in a predetermined, predictable disaster.

Tagged , , ,

beauty and terror

833056061_a860237ce2_o

Is it possible that the ideal of perfection is flawed from the root and contradicts human nature? We experience happiness, beauty and pleasure in a more complex way than theories of salvation and utopia often suggest. Pleasure and pain are not the opposites they might appear to be. Physical pain is often associated with sexual or spiritual pleasure. Fear, pity and sorrow are tantalising emotions, they make us feel alive, healthy, fortunate.

If the expectation of happiness leads to disappointment, then is the existence of terror a source of comfort? The paradox of beauty through horror has been defined in Aristotle’s Poetics, though the accounts of the cathartic power of the tragedy and our “delight in contemplating the most exact likenesses of things that are in themselves painful to see.” Perhaps abolishing disease does not mean an end to suffering, as pain - or the fear of it - is something we need as humans?

Kant calls the sublime a “negative pleasure”, attributing to it a redemptive insight; the realisation of human freedom from natural law. (Matthew Kieran, Contemporary debates in aesthetics and the philosophy of art). Perhaps the pain of illness is simply too real to evoke beauty or pleasure, as it represents the exact opposite: human’s complete submission to the natural law.

These theories of beauty or pleasure derived from terror are relevant within the context of art. Art is the filter through which we can enjoy these negative emotions safely. However, if pure science can be seen as an art form, it most definitely one excelling in fusing both beauty and terror.

Tagged , , , ,

a few words of pessimism

schopenhauer_pag1

“There is only one inborn erroneous notion … that we exist in order to be happy … So long as we persist in this inborn error … the world seems to us full of contradictions. For at every step, in great things and small, we are bound to experience that the world and life are certainly not arranged for the purpose of maintaining a happy existence…hence the countenances of almost all elderly persons wear the expression of … disappointment.”

Schopenhauer The World as Will and Representation

Tagged ,

the Equasion of HAPPINESS

hirst_54801t

Health has often been attributed to happiness - or perhaps more accurately: disease ultimately causes unhappiness. The famous roman phrase, ‘healthy mind in a healthy body’ is accepted as one of life’s absolute truths.
There is probably no argument with the fact the physical pain, weakness or the threat of an imminent death cause suffering. But are people ever happy for simply being well? In the same way that we never give much thought to our bodily functions until they are interrupted by illness, could we ever recognise our health as something to be happy about?

Is the pursuit of happiness constructed of removing elements of pain? Is there a linear logic in the utopian equation? Suffering = unhappiness, no suffering = happiness?

Tagged , ,